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I.  Introduction 
T
HE  hypothesis  that  utility  maximization 
underlies  human  behaviour  is  perhaps  the 
most  widely  accepted paradigm  among  econo-
mists. Particularly in  the study of consumer be- 
haviour, numerous models have been built upon 
the hypothesis of utility maximization.  Reviews 
of these models can inter alia be found in Hou- 
thakker  (1961), Brown  and Deaton  (1972) and 
Barten (1977). 
The testing of the utility maximization hypoth- 
esis (HM) in real life situations appears to be a 
complicated affair. The main problem is that HM 
can  only  be  tested  conditional  upon  other  as-
sumptions.  An  individual's  utility  function1 is 
commonly  measured  via  the  individual's  ob-
served  behaviour.  We  call  that  indirect  mea-
surement. But the relationship between an indi- 
vidual's  utility  function  and  his  behaviour  is 
based  on  HM  itself.  Hence,  having  measured 
utility functions via  HM it becomes  difficult to 
use the measured utility function to test HM. 
Therefore, testing HM mostly reduces to test- 
ing certain restrictions which have to be satisfied 
by parameters in a system of demand equations. 
However, testing these restrictions is not without 
problems, as testing a certain restriction has to 
take place conditional upon the validity of other 
re~trictions.~ 
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Throughout the paper the term "utility function"  will be 
used to denote the general concept, whereas the term "wel- 
fare function"  will  be used  for the  more narrowly defined 
concept introduced in  section 11. 
In any case one has to specify functional forms for the 
As far as testing has been carried out, results 
are  not  very  encouraging  (cf.  Barten,  1977; 
Wales  and  Woodland,  1976). But,  since  many 
additional  assumptions  are  no in~olved,~  firm 
conclusions  can  be  drawn from these negative 
outcomes. 
Given these problems, several paths are open 
to the student of  consumer behaviour.  First he 
may  want  to  dispense with  the utility  concept 
altogether and  only hypothesize  certain  consis- 
tency properties  of  individual choices. This ap- 
proach was taken by Samuelson (1938). If, how- 
ever, the assumptions on individual preferences 
are  made  sufficiently  strong,  especially  if  one 
adopts the strong axiom of revealed preference, 
their implications for behaviour are equivalent to 
the restrictions  derived from HM (cf. Houthak- 
ker, 1950; Stigum, 1973). Hence, testing the re- 
strictions implied by the strong axiom of revealed 
preference is equivalent to testing HM. Empiri- 
cal  work  in  this  area  (cf.  Koo,  1963;  Mossin 
1972)  suggests  that for  everyday  commodities 
(mainly food) most purchases of individual fami- 
lies are not inconsistent with the strong axiom of 
revealed preference  theory. However, in  many 
cases  purchases  are  such  that  neither  consis- 
tency  nor  inconsistency  can  be  assessed  (cf. 
Koo,  1963). Koo  (1974)  states that  "with  few 
exceptions,  almost  all  families  made  at  least 
some inconsistent  choices"  (p.  174). He finds 
that  inconsistencies  do not  arise  very  often  if 
purchases are in the neighbourhood of past ex- 
perience. For less routine-like purchases incon- 
sistencies are more likely to occur.4 
Parenthetically,  it  may  be  mentioned  that 
aggregate demand functions have a tendency to 
be  in  agreement  with  the  strong  axiom  of  re-
demand  equations.  Even  when  using  flexible  forms  (e.g., 
Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 1975) the specification may 
be expected to affect the result. 
For example, it is usually assumed that individuals have 
identical utility functions, or that an individual's  utility pa- 
rameters are not affected by  consumption patterns of  other 
individuals, that utility functions do not shift over time, etc. 
Moreover, estimation  is often based  on aggregate data. 
The empirical investigations in the present paper are con- 
cerned with durables. Extrapolating Koo's findings we would 
expect HM to be violated relatively often for these expendi- 
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vealed preference even if  the individual demand 
functions  are not  (Mossin,  1972; Maks,  1977). 
Therefore the application of  HM-based systems 
of  demand  functions to aggregate data may  be 
justified although this does not tell us very much 
about the validity of HM on the individual level. 
A second path sometimes taken is to conduct 
small-scale experiments in which environmental 
factors are sufficiently under control to allow for 
conclusive  testing.  Examples  of  this  approach 
are the studies by MacCrimmon and Toda (1969) 
and by Battalio et al. (1973). Both of these stud- 
ies  yield  results  that are  mainly  (but not  uni-
formly) consistent with  HM. 
Unfortunately, conclusions based on relatively 
simple laboratory  settings cannot be readily ex- 
tended to real-life situations. Indeed, it may  be 
argued  that in particular the complexity of  real 
life in connection with the human being's limited 
capacity to process information and solve prob- 
lems  (cf.  Hogarth,  1975)  prevents  individuals 
from maximizing utility.  This leads to the third 
path. One may assume that in complex situations 
individuals  are unable  to  maximize  utility  but 
rather resort to simple rules-of-thumb. This may 
lead  to  so-called  satisficing  behaviour.  Some 
aspects of  satisficing behaviour  are outlined  in 
section IV. 
Finally, there is a fourth path, which is the one 
adopted in  the present paper. As we  suggested 
above, testing of  HM is difficult because utility 
functions  are usually  indirectly  measured, i.e., 
via  observations  on  economic  behaviour.  It 
seems  worthwhile  therefore  to  investigate  the 
possibility of developing direct methods of men- 
surement of utility functions, i.e., without having 
to rely on observations of economic behaviour. If 
that can  be  done, one can  test  HM in  a more 
straightforward manner. 
For direct measurement of utility functions in 
practice  one  needs  to  make  more  specific  as- 
sumptions than the usual ones of differentiability 
and quasi-concavity.  In  particular  we  shall  as- 
sume  that  measurement  on a cardinal  scale  is 
possible and their functional form will  be spec- 
ified a priori. This entails the risk of misspecify- 
ing the functional form of the utility function and 
consequently deriving wrong  empirical  implica- 
tions. So, when measuring utility functions, both 
the assumption of  cardinality itself and the hy- 
pothesized  functional shape of  the  utility func- 
tion  should be severely tested. In section I1 we 
briefly outline a particular kind of cardinal utility 
function. This so-called individual welfare func- 
tion  (IWF) has been measured by  simple direct 
questioning methods and put to test in a number 
of  investigations with quite favourable  result^.^ 
Given these results we adopt the IWF as an ade- 
quate description of  individual preferences. 
Having  adopted  a particular  cardinally  mea-
sured utility function, most of the problems en- 
countered with indirectly measured utility disap- 
pear.  Armed with knowledge  of  an individual's 
utility  function  we  can,  by  observing  his  be- 
haviour, in  theory, tell  whether  any  economic 
action he undertakes will maximize his utility or 
not. 
In  section  I1  the  concept  of  utility  used 
throughout the paper is explained and a deriva- 
tion  is given of  the behavioural  implications  of 
HM. In section I11 the behavioural implications 
are confronted with the data. It will appear that, 
under  the  assumptions  used  to derive  the be- 
havioural implications, HM does not explain the 
data. In section IV the alternative hypothesis of 
satisficing behaviour is investigated heuristically. 
Section V presents evidence for the appropriate- 
ness of the satisficing approach. Section VI con- 
cludes the paper by stating a number of qualifica- 
tions  to the general  validity  of  the  results  ob- 
tained. Finally, lines of possible future research 
are pointed at. 
11. 	 Maximizatiori of a Multivariate Logriormal 
Welfare Furictiori 
In this section we specify the utility function, 
point  at  some empirical  evidence  regarding  its 
shape and derive  the first  order conditions for 
utility maximization. 
A.  The Utility Function 
Our specification of an individual's utility func- 
tion rests upon  the notion  of  a utility  tree.  We 
assume that an individual who must decide how 
to spend his income on various expenditure cate- 
gories will adopt a multi-stage procedure. In the 
first stage he decides upon a preliminary  alloca- 
tion of  his income over a limited number, say I, 
of  broad  categories.  Our  analysis  will  be  con-
cerned with the first stage only. Under HM, the 
References are given in section I1 MAXIMIZING 0R  SATISFICING?  5.5  1 

allocation of the money amounts y, (i= 1, . . . . . , 
I) to the I categories takes place in such a way 
that  the  individual's  utility  function  is  max-
imized. 
The I categories will be rather complex com- 
posites. That is, in each category a large number 
of characteristics may be distinguished. By inter 
alia assuming that an individual is able to evalu- 
ate the  satisfaction  derivable from  any  set  of 
characteristics  on  a  [O,  11-scale,  Van  Praag 
(1968)  establishes  an  isomorphism  between 
probability  theory  and utility  theory. Making a 
few additional  assumptions he then shows that 
the evaluation of the vector  Y = (y,, y,,  . . . ,y,)' 
of money amounts yi allocated to various expen- 
diture categories can, under fairly weak condi- 
tions, be approximated by 
exp [-$( In  (t) - b)' C-I  (In (t)-  fi)] 
dt, . . . dt,  (1) 
where 
We  call  (1) the  individual's  individual  welfare 
function  (IWF). The reader will recognize (1) as 
the I-variate lognormal distribution function (cf. 
Aitchison and Brown, 1957). The parameters ,ii 
and 2 may vary over individuals. In the present 
framework they have a psychological rather than 
a probabilistic meaning. 
We shall not go into the interpretation of fi and 
C in the present paper but refer to earlier work.6 
Some comments on the empirical validity of (1) 
are in  order,  because our subsequent analysis 
rests upon it. 
Two important implications of  (1) have been 
confronted with large bodies  of  data. First the 
case I = 1 has been considered. That is, all ex- 
penditures are lumped into one broad category, 
E.g.,  Van Praag  (1968,  1971), Van  Praag and Kapteyn 
(1973). 
"total  expenditures."  Taking  savings as post-
poned expenditures the category of total expen- 
ditures may be equated to in~ome.~  In this case 
(1) implies that an individual's evaluation of dif- 
ferent income levels will approximately follow a 
lognormal  distribution  function,  to  be  written 
A(y;p,u), which  stands for the  univariate  log- 
normal distribution  function with parameters p 
and u.  We call A(y;p,u) the individual's welfare 
finnction of  income  (WFI). 
An individual's WFI is measured by confront- 
ing  him  with  a  number  of  evaluations,  like 
"good,"  "sufficient,"  "bad,"  etc.  and  asking 
him  which  income levels in  his  opinion  corre-
spond to these evaluations. Next the evaluations 
are  translated  into  numbers  that  partition  the 
[O,l]-interval into equal subintervals. This trans- 
lation is based on an information theoretical ar- 
gument  (Van Praag,  1971). Thus we obtain for 
the individual a number of numerical evaluations 
U(z,) and the corresponding income levels z,, i = 
1, . . . ,n, where n is the number of evaluations 
offered to the individual (usually between 5 and 
8). If  the sequence {U(z,),z,):'=, would be in ac- 
cordance with Van Praag's theory, there would 
hold U(z,) = N((1n z, - I), or In z, = p + I~~)/u;O, 
aw,, where 1v,  follows from N(w,; 0,l) = i/(n + 
1).  Allowing for white noise the individual's  p 
and u are estimated from the regression 
Up until now, WFIs of about 14,000 individu- 
als from nine different European countries have 
been measured in the way described above.s The 
lognormality  of the WFIs has been tested in  a 
number of ways. Non-linearity  tests have been 
applied  to  (5)  (Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn,  1973; 
Kapteyn,  1977);  various  alternative  functional 
forms have been compared to the lognormal dis- 
tribution  function  (Van  Herwaarden  and  Kap- 
teyn,  1978). The validity  of  the measurements 
has been  investigated by  trying  to  explain  the 
measured parameters in p and u by economically 
meaningful  variables  like  income  and  family 
composition. For a short review, see Van Her- 
waarden, Kapteyn, Van Praag  (1977). None of 
these tests led to a  rejection  of  the lognormal 
form.  Indeed the comparison  with  other func- 
'In the sequel the word "income"  will exclusively denote 
"after  tax disposable income." 
Cf. Kapteyn (1977), Van Herwaarden, Kapteyn, and Van 
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tional forms indicates that the lognormal function 
is superior to any alternative distribution func- 
tion as a description of the shape of the WFI. 
The outcomes of the various tests also seem to 
confirm the cardinality of the WFIs. It is hard to 
imagine how the consistently good performance 
of the lognormal WFI in the various tests could 
obtain if the welfare levels U(zi)would have no 
meaning, i.e., if  they could be replaced by  any 
monotonically  increasing transformation. 
A  second  implication  of  (1)  is  that  money 
amounts y,  spent on any of the I  categories are 
evaluated  according to a  univariate  lognormal 
distribution function, to be written A,(y,;p,,cri). 
We call A,(y,;p,  ,cr,) the partial  welfare function 
(PWF) of  the expenditure category under  con-
sideration.  Employing  the  same  measurement 
technique  as with  WFIs,  Kapteyn,  Van  Her-
waarden, and Van Praag (1977) have measured 
9,500 PWFs of about 3,000 individuals pertaining 
to 33 different expenditure categories. Applying 
the same tests as applied to WFIs (see above) 
they  found that  the lognormality  of  the PWFs 
could not be rejected. 
Experience with multivariate welfare functions 
is more limited. On the basis of the theoretical 
analysis in Goedhart and Kapteyn (1978) these 
authors are presently involved  in  the measure- 
ment  of  bivariate  welfare  functions  of  income 
and time. However, hitherto only limited testing 
of the bivariate lognormal form has been done. 
Dagenais (1977) reports on the measurement of 
an average bivariate welfare function of income 
and air quality for groups of people. Comparison 
with a quadratic and a bivariate normal specifica- 
tion leads her to adopt the bivariate lognormal 
specification  as the best  representation  of  her 
data. 
In sum: The lognormal specification of WFIs 
and  PWFs has been tested in  various  studies. 
The bivariate  lognormal  specification has been 
investigated less extensively. Since none of the 
investigations mentioned has produced counter- 
evidence for the lognormal form we adopt (1) as 
the utility function describing individual prefer- 
ence~:~ 
The reader will notice that W(Y)  vanishes if  one of the 
elements of  Y equals zero, i.e., if an individual does not spend 
money on some category. This implies that if  the individual 
wants to maximize his utility, he has to spend money on all 
categories. Note however that the definition of the categories 
has  not  been  discussed  so far. In  fact, it  is Van  Praag's 
ASSUMPTION I. 	 The  jiinctional  shape of the irz- 
dividual utilityfiinction  is given 
by (1). 
Next  we  derive  first  order  conditions  for 
maximization  of  (1)  subject  to a  budget  con-
straint. 
B.  First Order Conditionsfor Utility 
Maximization 
Before deriving first order conditions for utility 
maximization  we  will  have to be  more specific 
with regard to (1): Intuitively, it seems plausible 
that an individual tries to reduce the complexity 
of the money allocation problem as far as possi- 
ble.  One way  of  doing  so efficiently  (from  an 
informational point of view) is to consider only 
expenditure categories of  which  the PWFs are 
independent. For a more detailed motivation we 
refer to Van Praag (1968, section 3.4 and p. 120). 
Therefore  we  take 2  (cf.  equation  (4))  to be 
diagonal: 
ASSUMPTION  2 is diagonal.  11. 
Some empirical evidence in favour of assumption 
I1 is given in section 111. 
Given assumptions I and 11, HM amounts to 
the solution of the following problem: lo 
subject to 
where  y  is  the  individual's  income.  Shorten 
A(yi;pi,ui)to Ai(yi) and write  Ai(yi) for the de- 
rivative of Ai with respect to y,.  Then the solu- 
tion for the maximization problem is 
contention that the definition  of the expenditure categories 
will vary with the decision problem at hand (see also below, 
subsection IIIB). In making  purchases individuals consider 
only a "relevant  set"  (or as it is called in psychology  and 
marketing research, the "evoked  set").  As we shall analyze 
lzow much individuals spend on certain expenditure catego- 
ries, taking the decision to spend or not to spend on a cate- 
gory  as given,  we  assume  that  the  choice  of  expenditure 
categories is such that no y, is zero. In section VI we shall 
moreover pay more attention to the sensitivity of our empiri- 
cal results to the adopted form of the utility function. 
lo Every individual may choose a different number of ex- 
penditure categories, I. This choice is immaterial for the tests 
to be applied. 5.53  MAXIMIZING 0R  SATISFICING? 
Ai(Yi)/Ai(~i)= Aj(~j)/Aj(Yj) 
2 . . I  1..  j-i).  (8) 
It can be shown that, when the yi and y,  satisfy 
(8), second order conditions for a maximum are 
also fulfilled  (Van Praag,  1968, pp.  133 ff.). In 
words, (8) states that the relative marginal utility 
of  an additional florin should be the same in all 
expenditure directions. 
Relation  (8)  becomes  slightly  more  compli-
cated if  we allow  for the possibility  that some 
expenditure categories pertain to durables.  By 
definition a consumer durable, i, is expected to 
produce a service flow over a fairly long period, 
say ki years. A rational consumer will therefore 
regard the purchase of a durable good partly as 
an investment and will therefore maximize utility 
subject to 
1(Yllkl) = Y,  (9) 
i 
rather than (7).12 It would also be appropriate to 
replace the PWFs Ai(yi;pi,ui)  by A(yi/ki;pi - In 
(ki),ui), but these expressions are identical. 
Maximizing  (6) subject to (9) leads to 
In  the  next  section  data  are investigated  in 
order to ascertain whether relations like (10) are 
discernible. 
111.  Testing for Utility Maximization 
The data used are from a written survey con- 
ducted in  1971. For details see Van  Praag  and 
Kapteyn (1973). The measurement of PWFs and 
WFIs on the basis of this sample is reported on 
by  Kapteyn et al. (1977). 
In addition to the information reported in the 
aforementioned papers, individuals in the sample 
were  also asked  whether they  planned  to buy 
certain durables, and if  so, how much they ex- 
pected to spend on them. This information was 
collected for 31 durables. For a good an individ- 
ual planned to buy he was asked to answer ques- 
tions which served to measure his PWF (cf. sub- 
section IIA) of that good. The questionnaire left 
l1 All  expenditure categories used  in the present  study to 
test HM  pertain  to durables. 
l2 We  ignore the role of interest rates, imperfect capital 
markets, myopia, time preference, etc., since these do not 
affect  the basic argument. 
room for a maximum of  four PWFs. This does 
not seem to have been very restrictive since only 
51 respondents out of  a total of  1,086 did  give 
four PWFs. 
The number of 31 durables has been reduced to 
28  by  combining  two  goods  (new  cars  and 
second-hand cars, since the distinction seems to 
have been unclear to some respondents) and by 
dropping  two goods  (floor  covering,  since  no 
quantities were specified, which makes the mean- 
ing of y, ambiguous, and gas-rings, since only two 
observations are available). Thus 1,054 individ- 
uals remain in the sample with at least one mea- 
sured PWF, yielding  1,739 measured  PWFs in 
total. 
In  testing  for utility  maximization,  we  have 
deliberately  used data on purchase plans rather 
than data on actual purchases. It was felt that if 
utility maximization is the basic mechanism guid- 
ing  decisions,  it  is  more  likely  to  show up  in 
purchase plans than in actual purchases where a 
number of unknown influences may  disturb the 
picture.13 
A.  A Test Based on Multiple Observations 
In order to test (10) we impose the following 
stochastic structure: 
2 . i  1, .  j-i  (11) 
where t runs over all individuals with respect to 
whom information on both the rth  andjTh expendi-
ture category is available. The errors eiit are as- 
sumed to follow a N(O,a,,)  distribution. If  (10) 
were to hold exactly, estimation of  (11) should 
yield aij  = 0, pij # 0. Presumably, however, the 
parameters pi, ui, pj, uj in  A,,  A,,  Aj,  Aj suffer 
from errors of measurement.14 These measure- 
ment  errors will  tend  to bias  estimates  of  pi, 
downwards and to bias the estimates of aijup-
wards. As long as the measurement errors in the 
parameters are not excessive, however,15 we ex- 
l3 For instance, a refrigerator of  a given size and  make may 
be the outcome of  the utility maximization process, but due to 
the influence of  the salesman, or due to an accidental supply 
shortage, the individual may as yet  decide to buy a different 
type of  refrigerator. 
l4  Cf. subsection IIA. 
l5 The results obtained by Kapteyn, Van Herwaarden, and 
Van Praag  (1977) indicate that the errors of  measurement are 
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pect the corrected coefficient of determination, 
R2, corresponding to (11) to be positive. 
Out of the 1,054 individuals in the sample, we 
were able to measure p,, a, and y,  of more than 
one expenditure category for 458 individuals: For 
96 (i,  j)-combinations (out of a maximum possible 
number of 378) more than two observations were 
available. The maximum number of observations 
in one cell was 14. The pattern of non-empty cells 
seems to give support to assumption 11. The vast 
majority of the non-empty cells pertain to com- 
binations of durables for which interdependency 
of PWFs is highly unlikely. As an illustration we 
mention that the three cells with the largest num- 
ber of observations pertain to the combinations 
(washing machine, moped), (automatic washing 
machine, camera), and (gramophone, film cam- 
era). 
When  running  the  96  regressions  (11) it ap- 
pears that 47 I?2-values are positive and 49 values 
are negative.  The average R2, weighted by the 
number  of  observations,  is  0.12.  Sixteen 
F-values are significant at the  10% level. 
It is  difficult  to draw firm  conclusions  from 
these results.  For example, in case there is  no 
correlation at all between the variables at the left 
and right hand side of (11) the expected number 
of significant F-values is equal to 9.6. The num- 
ber actually found, 16, is significantly (at the 10% 
level) in excess of  9.6, but still is not very im- 
pressive. The average R2being equal to 0.12 sug- 
gests that there is some relationship of the type 
(11) in the data, but the fact remains that a ma- 
jority of the regressions yield negative p values. 
This ambiguous picture is caused by the very 
small number of observations per (i,j)-combina- 
tion (typically between 3 and 6). That makes the 
correction for degrees of freedom inherent in 
very important but at the same time these R2s are 
unreliable. Also, the F-tests applied will be sensi- 
tive for departures of normality of the E,,,  in (11). 
Since  the  above  analysis  uses  observations 
only on the 458 individuals who supplied at least 
two PWFs, information on more than half of the 
individuals  in  the  1,054-sample  has  been  ne-
glected.  Neither  have the individuals'  incomes 
and WFIs been used. The ambiguous results ob- 
tained so far make it urgent to make a fuller use 
of  the data available. At  the cost of  two addi- 
tional assumptions we will be able to employ all 
the data and, as a consequence, we shall obtain 
more clearcut results. 
B.  A Test Based on All Observcrtions 
The first additional assumption we make is 
ASSUMPTION 111. 	 When  considering  the  pur- 
chase of  good i,  an individ- 
ual  distinguishes  two  cate-
gories  only:  good  i  and 
"other  expenditures." 
As with assumption 11, this assumption can be 
motivated by  the supposition that an individual 
adheres to simple  rules.  The individual  is  as-
sumed to minimize the complexity of the money 
allocation problem by reducing I to its sensible 
minimum, 2. 
Given'assumption I11 the utility maximization 
problem becomes 
max &(yi)Ai(yi) 	 (12) 
Y,,Y1 
subject to 
where yi is the money spent on all expenditure 
categories other than i and hi the corresponding 
PWF. For the moment we ignore the complica- 
tion due to differences in durability of the goods. 
One of the first order conditions now reads: 
where 7 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding 
to the budget constraint. The Lagrange multiplier 
can be given the usual interpretation of marginal 
utility of income at equilibrium (cf. Phlips, 1974, 
p.  21), i.e., 
where  UO  is  the indirect utility  function  of  in- 
come. 
Relation (15) will be employed after making a 
second assumption: It has been observed by Van 
Praag (1968, p. 132) and by Kapteyn (1977, sec- 
tion  2.6)  that  in  the  lognormal  framework  the 
indirect  utility  function  of  income  is  approxi- 
mately lognormal as well. Although the WFI is 
by genesis not an indirect utility function of in- 
come, it seems reasonable to take the WFI, U(z), 
as an approximation to the indirect utility func- 
tion, at least in the point z = y.16 We thus make 
Ih As indicated in subsection IIA, an individual's WFI is 
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ASSUMPTION IV. 	 U"(Z) =  A(z;p,a),  in  the 
neighbourhood of y. 
Hence 
It follows from assumption IV, (14), (15), and 
(16) that 
Thus,  (17)  states  that  under  HM the  relative 
marginal  utility  from spending  money  on cate- 
gory i will be equal to the relative marginal utility 
of income. 
Allowing once more for differences in durabil- 
ity we specify the following regression equation 
which is estimated for 28 durables. 
where Ti represents the number of observations 
on the Ch expenditure category. The error term eit 
is assumed to follow a N(O,w,)  distribution. 
It  turns  out that  19 out of  28  E2-values are 
negative. Only  2 F-values are significant at the 
5% level, whereas one more F-value is significant 
at the 10% level. In other words, 3 F-values are 
significant  at the 10% level, which is  about the 
number  one  would  expect  under  the  null-
hypothesis  of  no  correlation between  the  vari- 
ables at the left and right hand side of (17). The 
average value of R2over all 28 goods (weighted 
by the number of observations per good) is equal 
to -0.00. 
Given the reasonable number of observations 
per good and the consistent picture  across  the 
goods, we tend to conclude that our data do not 
provide any evidence in favour of  HM. Before 
discussing in the concluding section the sensitiv- 
ity of this outcome for the various assumptions 
that have been made in the course of the analy- 
sis, we first turn to different hypotheses that may 
fit the data better. 
hypothetical  income levels. It appears that indi./iduals  take 
their own actual income and the corresponding evaluation as 
a reference point. Presumably an individual's  evaluation of 
his actual income is mainly a reflection of his indirect utility 
function of income. Hence we expect  U(y)and  UO(y) to be 
approximately  equal. 
IV.  Satisficing 
Utility  maximization  essentially  requires  the 
simultaneous solution of a number of interrelated 
problems.  Even in  the simple case where  only 
two expenditure categories are involved (good i 
and "other  expenditures")  an individual has to 
decide simultaneously how much satisfaction he 
expects to derive from yiand yi. Since expendi- 
ture categories usually are complex composites 
of many characteristics,  such a task may easily 
exceed the individual's  cognitive capacities. 
A  possible  way  to  cope with  the  excessive 
complexity of decision problems is to make deci- 
sions sequentially (cf. Simon, 1955), that is, de- 
cision alternatives are identified one by one and 
an alternative is adopted if  it exceeds a certain 
aspiration level. This type of behaviour is called 
satisficing.  Two  examples  may  elucidate  the 
concept. 
Example  I:  An  individual  is  considering  the 
purchase of a toothbrush, which can be bought at 
different prices at different  stores. Given some 
prior ideas about the distribution  of prices, the 
individual may  adopt the strategy of setting an 
aspiration  level."  He will  search  for  brushes 
until he finds one of  which  the price  does not 
exceed his aspiration level. Of course the aspira- 
tion level may change in the course of the search 
process. 
Example 2:  An individual is seeking employ- 
ment. At irregular intervals he is faced with a job 
offer. Once he encounters a job  offer  of  which 
the wage  exceeds his aspiration levells he will 
accept it. 
Given the sequential nature of the information 
it can be shown that satisficing is optimal under a 
variety  of  conditions  (cf.  Simon,  1955; 
Rothschild,  1974; Lippman and McCall,  1976). 
Even if information is not provided sequentially, 
it may be supposed that an individual, due to his 
limited information processing capacity, tries to 
decompose a decision problem into a number of 
consecutive  stages.  After  this  decomposition, 
satisficing may be the optimal strategy. If, on the 
other hand, decision problems are simple, there 
is no need for a sequential strategy. In that case 
we expect a type of behaviour that is more con- 
sistent with utility  maximization. 
17 Also called  "reservation  price"  in this context. 

la Also called  "reservation  wage"  in this context. 
556  THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS  AND STATISTICS 
The complexity of a problem introduces uncer-  N(ati;O,l) = A,.  (21) 
tainty in the sense that  an individual is unable to 
grasp  the  structure of  the problem  due to his 
"computational  inability."I9  In this connection 
we mention two experiments by 0lander (1975). 
He finds that in well-defined  decision problems 
utility maximization usually gives a better expla- 
nation of behaviour than satisficing. If, however, 
the  information  on alternatives  decreases,  sat-
isficing  becomes  the more frequently  observed 
strategy. 
In  sum,  we  observe that  consumption  deci- 
sions are complex. This complexity, in conjunc- 
tion  with  an  individual's  limited  cognitive 
abilities, leads to uncertainty. A sequential deci- 
sion strategy which can be described by satisfic- 
ing is then adopted. 
In the next subsection we outline the meaning 
that can be attached to satisficing behaviour in 
the framework of the IWF. 
A.  Satisficing and Partiul Welfare  Functions 
Reconsider the amount yi  that an individual 
intends to spend on the ithcategory. According to 
the satisficing hypothesis, yi  has to exceed the 
individual's  aspiration  level.  We  may  opera-
tionalize the hypothesis in a variety of ways, of 
which two classes will be considered. 
I. The satisficing hypothesis may be interpreted 
in such a way that the welfare expected from 
the purchase of the ith good has to exceed a 
certain level.  In terms  of  PWFs, y,  has to 
satisfy 
where Ai stands for the aspiration level with 
respect to the ith good. From (19) it follows 
that 
In  (y,) 2 F~+ a',u,,  (20) 
where atifollows from 
l9 Cf. Simon (1972) who states "What  we refer to as 'un- 
certainty'  in chess or theorem proving, therefore, is uncer- 
tainty  introduced  into a  perfectly  certain  environment  by 
inability-computational  inability-to  ascertain the structure 
of that environment. But the result of the uncertainty, what- 
ever its  source, is  the  same:  approximation  must  replace 
exactness  in  reaching  a  decision.  In  particular,  when  the 
uncertainty takes the form of an unwieldy problem space to 
be  explored, the problem  solving process  must incorporate 
mechanisms  for determining when the search or evaluation 
will stop and an alternative will be chosen"  (p.  170). 
We  shall  denote  (20)  as  hypothesis  HI'. 
Notice that (19) refers to an aspiration level 
in  welfare  terms:  the welfare  derived from 
spending an amount yi (as measured by the ith 
PWF) has to exceed Ai. It is also conceivable 
that the individual states his aspiration level 
in money terms directly. This leads to a sec- 
ond class of  operationalizations. 
11.  If  an individual's  PWF of the ith expenditure 
category is located far to the right  (on the 
money  axis)  he  will  presumably  have  to 
spend a larger amount on the ithcategory to 
exceed his  aspiration  level  than  somebody 
whose  PWF is located more to the left.  In 
general, we expect an individual's aspiration 
level to be high when his PWF is located far 
to the right and to be low when his PWF is 
located to the left. This suggests that the aspi- 
ration level depends on one of  the location 
parameters of the PWF. In particular, we will 
investigate whether an individual's aspiration 
level is a multiple of either the median, the 
mean, or the mode of the PWF. This leads to 
three competing hypotheses for the explana- 
tion of y,: 
Yi  2  P'i  ex~(Fi)  (H2': median) 
(22) 
yi 2 yti exp(Fi + +ui2)  (H3': mean) 
(23) 
yi 2  6', exp(pi - at2)  (H4': mode) 
(24) 
In the next section a selection process will be 
described which leads to the adoption of  one of 
these four hypotheses on the basis of the sample. 
V.  Choosi~ig  between Four Hypotheses 
The choice between the four hypotheses stated 
in the previous section will take place in a rather 
heuristic  manner.  All  four  hypotheses  were 
stated as inequalities incorporating a single un- 
known parameter (ati  ,pti  ,yti, or 6',). Evidently, 
it is possible to choose the unknown parameters 
such that all four hypotheses hold. We therefore 
make the additional assumption that individuals 
plan the amount yi in such a way that the aspira- 
tion level is exceeded by a constant proportion 557 MAXIMIZING  OR . SATISFICING? 
which is the same for each indi~idual.~~  On the 
other hand, we  allow for individual  differences 
by  specifying a stochastic structure. 
The four hypotheses  are reformulated as fol- 
lows: 
In  (yit) = Pit  + quit + xit  (HI)  (25) 
1"  (yit) = Pi + Pit + uit  (H2)  (26) 
The errors ~,~,u,~,v,,  and w,, have, by assumption, 
variances  mXt2,  mu:,  u;,  mW:.  Further  assump- 
tions on the errors will be made below. The pa- 
rameters  %,  p,, y,  and 6,  can be  estimated  for 
each good  separately. 
Since each of  the relationships  (25)  through 
(28) has the same dependent variable, a choice 
between them could be made on the basis of the 
criterion of  minimal residual variance. If  one of 
the four models is correct, this model should, on 
average, exhibit the lowest residual variance (cf. 
Theil,  1961, or Theil,  1971). Since each of  the 
equations  (25) through  (28) is estimated for 28 
different goods, it would be a rather safe policy 
to coin one of the equations "correct"  if it exhib- 
its the lowest residual variance for a large  ma- 
jority  of  the 28  goods. 
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning does not 
apply directly: the explanatory variables in (25) 
through (28) all contain errors of measurement2' 
whilst Theil's  result is based  on non-stochastic 
explanatory variables. 
Below  we  shall  develop  a  modification  of 
Theil's argument which is applicable to the pres- 
ent  situation.  Before  that,  we  will  be  able  to 
discard H4 by  a simple argument. 
A.  Elimination of  H4 
We  run regressions of the form 
with a,,,  a,,, a,,  parameters to be estimated and 
20 Below we briefly  discuss the more general case where 
aspiration  levels may  differ between individuals. 
2'  The measurement errors are at least as big as the stan- 
dard errors of the parameter  estimates in model (5).  Since 
U(zi) provides  a partitioning of the [O,l]-interval into equal 
subintervals, the wi have mean zero. As a consequence the 
covariance  of  the  parameter  estimates  in  (5) is zero.  We 
assume therefore that the measurement errors in wtt and oit 
are independent. 
eit an  identically  and  independently  distributed 
(i.i.d.) error term. If  (28) would hold, we should 
find  estimates for aZi,  CiZi, equal to minus  one. 
Due to the measurement errors in vi2,  however, 
the 62i  will be biased toward zero. But in any case 
we should find CiZi < 0.22  Running regression (29) 
for each of the 28 goods we find that CiZi is posi- 
tive for 25 goods. The three negative estimates 
are all within one standard error from zero. On 
the basis of  this result, H4 is discarded. 
B.  The Choice between HI,  H2 and H3 
We  call a model correct if  its error term has 
zero expectation and is distributed independently 
of the values  of  pitand  mi,. 
ASSUMPTION  One of  the hypotheses HI,  H2,  V. 
H3 is correct. 
Let sli2,  sZi2,  and sSi2  be the residual variances 
corresponding to HI, H2 and H3. Definitions are 
given in the appendix, where also an argument is 
developed  which  suggests  that the correct  hy- 
pothesis  will  be  the  one  exhibiting  lowest  re-
sidual variance for a majority of the 28  expendi- 
ture categories.  That argument is formalized in 
ASSUMPTION VI.  Zf  H2 is correct, P(sZi2  > s~~~) 
5 
 - $9 
Zf  H3 is correct, P(sSi2  > sli2) 
5 1 2. 
It  appears that for  21  out  of  the 28  goods sZi2 
exceeds s3i2.  If  H2 were correct, assumption VI 
implies P(sZi2  > s~~~) 5 $ and this outcome would 
have a probability smaller than 0.005. Hence we 
reject H2. 
Next, it appears that for 18 out of the 28 goods 
sSi2  exceeds sli2.  This leads to a rejection of H3 at 
the 10% level. 
Consequently,  we  take H1 to be the correct 
hypothesis. 
C.  Comments upon HI 
In table 1 the estimates of ai,  &i are presented, 
along with standard errors, R2-values and values 
22 This remark rests on the formula for the asymptotic bias 
of regression coefficients when there are errors of measure- 
ment (e.g., Johnston, 1972, formula (P42)),  on the assumption 
that the measurement errors are independent (cf. the previ- 
ous footnote), and on inspection of the variance-covariance 
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TABLE  1.-ESTIMATES WITH RESPECT TO  H1 
Standard 
Number of  Error of  -
Name of Good  Observations  hi  &,a  R Zb  N(hi;o,l) 
1  car  166  .59  .04  .54  .72 
2  house  57  .41  .13  .76  .66 
3  boat  13  .65  .14  .77  .74 
4  caravanlcountry cottage  16  .67  .13  .87  .75 
5  automatic dishwasher  64  .78  .06  .56  .78 
6  spin dryer  26  .78  .12  .64  .78 
7  dryer  28  .97  .10  .79  .83 
8  gas ring  29  .78  .08  .82  .78 
9  gas fire  28  .89  .10  .81  .81 
10  refrigerator  80  .71  .05  .72  .76 
11  sewing machine  66  .75  .06  .57  .77 
12  vacuum cleaner  64  .75  .07  .39  .77 
13  washing machine  7  .85  .22  .53  .80 
14  automatic washing machine  115  .81  .04  .37  .79 
15  tape recorder  123  .72  .05  .61  .76 
16  loudspeaker  54  .68  .ll  .37  .75 
17  gramophone  125  .77  .06  .35  .78 
18  wireless  158  .58  .04  .48  .72 
19  television (black & white)  80  .64  .06  .22  .74 
20  television (colour)  57  .70  .09  -.69  .76 
21  electric drill  6  1  .75  .05  .58  .77 
22  slide projector  78  .79  .05  .62  .79 
23  film camera  37  .68  .08  .33  .75 
24  film projector  19  .52  .ll  -.08  .70 
25  camera  68  .75  .07  .60  .77 
26  moped  2  1  .80  .08  .67  .79 
27  watch  58  .82  .06  .66  .79 
28  electric shaver  4  1  .96  .08  .26  .83 
a  Defined as (var ((G E)/F,))cAsymptot~cally  thls  can be approximated by  (s,,2/(T,  (cf  Cramer, 1969, p  96) - - 116:) 

Defined as (1 - ~,,~)/var(ln(y,)) 

of N(&,;O,l). The R2-values favourably contrast  Individuals I and I1 have the same value of pi 
with the R2-values  obtained with equation (18).23  but different values of a,.The larger value of mi 
H1 appears to be capable of explaining a consid-  makes  individual  I1 feel  that  he  has  to  spend 
erable proportion of the variance of In  (yi). The  more than individual I in order to attain the wel- 
strikingly  negative R2-value for colour TV may  fare level N(cq;O,l). Individual 111's  p is  larger 
be linked to the Dutch consumers'  limited  ex- than the other individuals' p,  and his a is equal to 
perience with colour TV, which was introduced  that of individual 11. As a consequence, he feels 
in The Netherlands about a year before the sur-  that he has to spend considerably more than the 
vey was held. This may have hindered the indi-  other two individuals to attain the welfare level 
viduals in  setting an aspiration level.  N(%;o,l). 
The meaning of the satisficing hypothesis H1 is  The values  of  the aspiration levels N(&;O,l) 
illustrated,  for an arbitrary  good  i, in  figure  1.  shown in table  1 are fairly close to each other. 
PWFs of three individuals, I, I1 and 111, are de- 
picted.  Given  the  aspiration  level  in  welfare 
terms  for  this  good,  N(ai;O,l), the  aspiration 
level in money terms of  the three individuals is 
given  by  the  abscissa-values  corresponding  to 
the ordinate-value N(cq;O, 1). 
23 Of  course  some caution is  required  in  comparing  the 
R2-values, since the dependent variables in (18) and (25) are 
different. Still such a comparison is not entirely meaningless 
(cf.  Granger and Newbold,  1976). -- 
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This hints  at the possibility that the aspiration 
level is the same across goods, being about 0.75. 
However, an approximate F-test for the equality 
of the cr, shows that the null-hypothesis of equal 
cq's  for all expenditure categories has to be re- 
jected  at the 0.1% level. A superficial glance at 
table  1 suggests that N(cu,;O,l) is slightly higher 
for  the  cheaper  goods.  This  phenomenon  re-
quires further research. 
The parameters cq  have been assumed to be 
constant across individuals. This assumption has 
been made for ease of exposition mainly and may 
easily  be  relaxed  by  adopting  a  random 
coefficients  framework.  The  estimated  bi are 
then consistent estimates of the mean cq  in  the 
population. Also the procedure for selecting HI 
is  not  affected. A random coefficients formula- 
tion essentially  adds a heteroskedastic  term  to 
the disturbance term xi, in  (25). Consequently, 
s1,2overestimates uZi2  even more than under the 
fixed coefficients interpretation. Hence the ran- 
dom  coefficients  formulation  would  imply  a 
smaller uzi2 and thus reinforce our choice of HI. 
Notice  that for the hypotheses  H2, H3, H4, a 
random coefficients formulation does not  make 
sense as the distributions of the coefficients can- 
not be distinguished from the error distributions 
in these models. 
D. Maximizing or Satisficing? 
Now that we have adopted HI as the adequate 
operationalization of satisficing behaviour we are 
able  to confront  its  logical  consequences with 
those of HM. 
Let n,  and N, denote the standard normal den- 
sity  and distribution functions, and define xi = 
(In (y,) - pi)/ui, x -- (In (y) - p)/u. Then it is 
immediate that 
Neglecting the error term in (25), H1 implies 
that  ni(xi)/Ni(xi) is  a  constant,24 whereas  HM 
implies (cf. equation  (17)): 
24 Both n,(x,)/N,(xi) and A,(y,) are monotonous functions 
of  (In  y, - ,u,)/~, only.  Since, according  to HI, A,(,,)  is 
constant, also ni(x,)/Ni(xi)  is constant. 
ni(xi) - uiy,  n(x) -
l~,(~,) uY 
These two different implications of H1 and HM 
suggest a simple way of choosing between both 
When running the regressions 
nir(xit) - -- cityit  at(&)  + tit, 7%+ 771, -- ---
Nit (xit)  VtYt  Nt(xt) 
(i = 1, . . . ,2  t = 1  . . . , Ti  (33) 
H1 would imply that the estimates of qlido not 
differ significantly from zero, whereas HM  would 
imply that the estimates of  r),  do not differ sig- 
nificantly from zero. 
It  appears  that  r),  differs  significantly  from 
zero at the  5%  level  for 27  out  of  28  goods, 
whereas  no single  differs significantly  from 
zero. These outcomes lead us once more to reject 
HM and to maintain HI. 
VI.  Cor~cludir~g Remarks 
In this paper directly measured cardinal wel- 
fare functions have been employed to compare 
the utility  maximization  hypothesis HM with a 
satisficing hypothesis HI. Given the assumptions 
made in the course of the analysis, the conclu- 
sion  seems unambiguous.  In making  purchase 
decisions  concerning  durables,  individuals 
"satisfice"  rather than "maximize."  In this con- 
cluding  section we will  first discuss briefly  the 
possible sensitivity of the results for the assump- 
tions made and, secondly, hint at some implica- 
tions for the study of consumer behaviour. 
Since the approach in this paper has been to 
use directly measured welfare functions to inves- 
tigate  whether  individuals  behave  so  as  to 
maximize their welfare  function, the choice of 
functional form of the welfare function seems to 
be crucial to the results. We have assumed that 
the  welfare  function  is  multivariate  lognormal 
(assumption I) and that it is additive, i.e., C is 
diagonal (assumption 11). In  subsection IIA we 
have pointed  at the  various  studies  that  have 
confirmed lognormality. 
Moreover, the results with respect to HM are 
probably  fairly  insensitive to the  lognormality 
assumption.  The quantities &/Ai and  X/A  that 
have been used in the analysis are monotonically 
decreasing functions of  In  yi  and  In  y, respec-
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transformations of In yi  and In y  could provide a 
substantially better fit. For instance if  we try to 
explain  In  y,  by  a regression on In  y  we get an 
average R2 (over 28 goods) equal to 0.03 with 11 
R2s negative.  Compared to the R~S generated by 
HI,  given in table 1, this is very low. Indeed it is 
generally found that with individual data income 
provides  a poor  explanation of  expenditure^.^^ 
The number of  transformations of In  y,, that can 
be tried in the empirical analysis is practically un- 
limited. If, for example, one would assume that 
the relevant utility function would be the sum of 
PWFs rather than their product, the first order 
conditions for utility maximization would suggest 
a  high  correlation  between  bt(uit) and  hjt(yjt) 
rather than between the quantities in regression 
(11). It turns out that out of  the 96 correlations 
that can be  computed  (cf.  subsection  IIIA) 47 
R2-values are negative, with an average equal to 
0.10. In fact if  we simply correlate in yit and In yjt 
we obtain 52 negative R2-values with an average 
equal to 0.04.  It is interesting to mention here 
that the sample distribution of the In y,, appears 
to be approximately normal. It is well known that 
if  the distribution of the In  y,, would be normal 
and the correlation between the In  yit and In  yjt 
(i f;j) is zero then these quantities are distributed 
independently. Consequently, transformations of 
them  would  also  show  zero-correlation.  Intui-
tively this would seem to imply that, in view of 
the low correlation between the In yit and In yj,  we 
observe, probably  transformations  of  the In  yjt 
and In  yit would always show low correlations. 
In favour of the diagonality of Z we have pro- 
vided  theoretical  arguments  in  subsection  IIB 
and empirical ones in subsection IIIA. The suc- 
cess of HI suggests, moreover, that the possibil- 
ity  of  Z  being  non-diagonal cannot  save  HM, 
since HI implies  that  marginal welfare  derived 
from a good (as measured by the corresponding 
PWF) is independent of  the marginal welfare of 
income.26  This is at variance with HM, whether 
or not Z is diagonal. 
The utility  maximization  hypothesis  may,  of 
course, be maintained by stating that the individ- 
ual welfare function does not reflect the theoreti- 
cal notion of a utility function. In particular, the 
ZS Since we look only at cross-section data, prices are left 
out of the analysis (they are assumed identical for all individ- 
uals). In the analysis of longitudinal data prices would enter 
the welfare functions. (Van Praag,  1968, ch. 4). 
26 Below we give an interpretation of this result. 
fact that the individual welfare function is mea- 
sured by  direct  questioning rather  than  by  ob- 
serving  behaviour  may  lead  one to adopt  this 
conclusion. This would imply, however, that the 
utility  function that  is  supposed  to govern  be- 
haviour has nothing to do with the individual's 
overtly expressed opinions (on income levels and 
expenditure  levels,  cf.  the  description  of  the 
measurement method in subsection IIA). Such a 
position  can never be refuted by  empirical evi- 
dence.  The  choice  of  a utility  concept has, in 
other words, to be made on a priori grounds. For 
reasons  of  scientific  fruitfulness  we  definitely 
prefer a concept that allows us to use evidence 
obtained from verbal statements by  individuals. 
Comparing  the testing  of  HM  carried  out in 
this study to indirect testing based on systems of 
demand  equations  a  few  observations  can  be 
made. First, both the direct and indirect methods 
require the specification of the functional form of 
the utility function. With the direct method one 
seems to have more possibilities to test the cor- 
rectness of  the specification. 
Second, with the direct method we  have not 
been forced to assume that different individuals 
have utility functions with identical parameters. 
The  parameters  of  PWFs  and  WFIs  may,  for 
instance, depend  on the existing  stock of  con- 
sumer durables, they  may be influenced by the 
consumption  of  others,  etc.  All  these  effects 
show up in the measured parameter values per 
individual and thus are automatically accounted 
for in the analysis. 
Third, contrary to most indirect tests found in 
the literature, we have used individual data, thus 
avoiding the cumbersome aggregation problem. 
On balance it seems that the direct testing is 
based on weaker  assumptions than  the various 
indirect tests found in the literature. The results 
of  the  direct  and  indirect  tests  are  much  the 
same, however.  Also  the indirect  tests  mostly 
reject  HM  (cf.  Barten,  1977;  Christensen, 
Jorgenson,  and Lau, 1975). 
Of  course the rejection  of  HM refers to the 
specific static formulation of the theory (although 
the investment  aspect of  the purchase  of  con- 
sumer durables has been taken into account, cf. 
subsection IIB). There are many ways in which 
the notion of utility maximization may recur in a 
more general framework. First of all the satisfic- 
ing hypothesis has been motivated by an individ- 
ual's limited computational and information pro- --  - 
-  - 
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cessing capacity. Taking into account such addi- 
tional restrictions  may easily lead  to a broader 
definition  of  the  concept  of  utility  maximiza- 
ti~n.'~ 
One of  the remarkable features of  HI is that 
the  budget  constraint  does not  seem to play  a 
role. It has to be kept in mind, however, that jli is 
measured  only  for individuals  who do plan  to 
spend money on a certain expenditure category. 
In a preliminary  process  of  determining budget 
shares  for  major  expenditure  categories  the 
budget  constraint  will  most  likely  play  a role. 
Thus the satisficing hypothesis seems to emerge 
as a sort of screening device: If  the budget con- 
straint allows  for the allocation of  a  sufficient 
amount of money to a particular expenditure cat- 
egory such that the individual's aspiration level is 
exceeded,  he  will  spend  the  money.  If  the 
amount does not exceed his aspiration level, he 
will  not  spend the money in that direction but 
either save it or allocate it to a different expendi- 
ture category. The satisficing hypothesis is thus 
seen  to  introduce  indivisibilities  of  consumer 
goods, beyond their physical indivisibility. Util- 
itv maximization  then becomes a combinatorial 
problem, with both the budget constraint and the 
aspiration levels as restrictions. 
These  and  other  hypotheses  require  further 
empirical  investigation.  In  the  present  paper, 
moreover,  the parameters of  WFIs and PWFs 
have been  taken as given. On the formation of 
welfare functions, research is being carried out 
(e.g.,  Kapteyn,  Wansbeek, and  Buyze,  1978). 
This  research  yields  insight  into  the  dynamic 
process  of  the  formation  of  preferences.  By 
combining  models  of  purchase  decisions  for 
given preferences and models of the formation of 
preferences,  we may hope to improve upon our 
understanding of individual consumer behaviour. 
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In  this  appendix  we  motivate  assumption  VI,  while 
explicitly accounting for measurement  errors in the p,, and 
mi,. The true values of the variables are denoted by asterisks. 
Thus we rewrite HI, H2, and H3 as 
By assumption V one of these three models is correct, i.e., 
its  errors follow  a  distribution  that  is  independent  of  the 
values of p*,, and a*,*  and has zero expectation. We assume 
finite population means and variances of P*~,,  u*!,, a2*,t  and 
ln(y,,),  which  are  denoted  as 5,z,e2'1, In(yi)* and 
V(p*it), V(a*it),  V(a2*tt),  V(ln(~,~)),  respectively. In general 
V(.) stands for the population variance of its argument. 
One sees that if H3 is correct, a,? exceeds a,?by the same 
quantity as a,.?exceeds a,? in case H2 is correct. Similar 
results are obtained for the case that H1 is correct. 
Next  we  introduce  the  quantities  s2(p,),  s2(u,), s2(at2) 
which  are by  definition  the  variances  of  the measurement 
errors in pit,  a!,,  a,:.  The quantities ln(yi),  pi,  z,  stand for 
the sample averages of the Ti observations ln(y,,), ptt,  mi,, aif. 
The measurement errors in pit  and ai,are assumed to have 
zero expectations and to be mutually independent and inde- 
pendent  of x,,, rrit, v,!,  1n(yit),  P*,~,  a*,,. 
Given these assumptions we can define the following con- 
sistent estimators &<,pi, and +, of a,, pi and yi: 
&, =  ln(y,) - kt  , --- -	 (A.  12) 
DL 
The last two estimators are unbiased. 
Residual variances  s,?,  s,:,  and s,?  are defined by 
1  T' 
Sli2 '--- z[Wyit) - /*it - &I/*zt12  (A.15)
Ti - I  t=1 
S312 '------ 2
Ti 
Llno'it) -9,- pit - +aif2I2.  (A. 17)  I 
Ti  - 1  ,=, 
Under very weak conditions s,,2 is a consistent estimator of 
[s2(p,)+ a,2s2(a,) + u~,~]; s2? is an unbiased and consistent 
estimator of [s2(y,)  + CT,,,~]; s3? is an unbiased and consistent 
estimator of [s2(p,) + is2(at2) + uui2]. 
Let us now turn to the motivat~on  of assumption VI. We 563  MAXIMIZING  OR  SATISFICING? 
start with the case that H2 is the correct hypothesis. In that 
case ad2> uUi2. The expectation of s,P  exceeds the expecta- 
tion  of  s2,2 by  [as2(u:) + u,~ - uU,2], which  is  clearly 
positive.  If the number of observations is sufficiently  large 
this will imply the first part of assumption VI. 
The case where H2 is supposed to be correct requires some 
more elaboration. First we observe that in this case u,;' 
ub2. Second we will  argue that probably ai2s2(u1) exceeds 
$s2(u,2).To that end we use the asymptotic approximation 
s2(u,2) ;=  ~(C?~)~S~(U,). Since it appears that iu+ > 6,for 24 out 
of 28  goods we take el to exceed 6,  and hence ai2s2(ui) to 
exceed ?gs2(u,2)  ('=(6i)2s2(u,)).  SO, if H3  is correct, s,,Z  is a 
consistent  estimator  of  a  quantity  which  is  [a,2s2(u,) -
*s2(ui2) + uZi2 - u1,2]larger than the quantity that is consis- 
tently  estimated  by  s,,2.  If  the  number  of  observations  is 
sufficiently  large this implies the last part of assumption VI. You have printed the following article:
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